Rethinking "DoD Jointness" and National Jointness"
II. Introduction
Throughout history, many authors have used European folklore as a medium to express complex ideas and clarify issues. Most known is the legend of King Arthur, a memorable story replete with rich allusions and profound metaphors. The Arthurian legend depicts Britain as a divided country: factional and disjointed with feudal entities fighting for control of the land. All seemed lost until the Lady of the Lake gave King Arthur the sword, Excalibur. Wielding this sword with vision, Arthur unified the people to bring order to a troubled land. There is a similar need for order leading to unity of effort in the realm of Joint Information Operations (JIO).
Current JIO cannot be effectively executed because Information Operations (IO) is a dynamic discipline that transcends the military community, permeates the national level, and thus makes the effort exponentially more complex. That complexity raises many questions and provides few answers.
This analysis will bring several of those important questions to the surface, and will propose that the joint community adapt a new JIO construct; one that reflects the true nature of multidimensional IO and unifies both joint and national efforts to prosecute an effective JIO campaign. The research will
show that current service and joint IO doctrine are incomplete in that they restrict the focus of IO. The argument will be made that much of the IO service doctrine remains in draft form, and where there is policy, it addresses only portions of the discipline. Further, an attempt is made to answer the question, "Why create a CINC-IO?" Lastly, this Joint Critical Analysis (JCA) argues that the IO discipline is a lacking arena. As such, it requires evolutionary thinking of what it means to be "joint" rather than continuing with traditional approaches to fill the gap. Using concepts and impressions from wellrespected strategists, the intent is to propose a new construct that will overcome current JIO limitations and facilitate effective unity of effort. As the Lady of the Lake wished of Arthur, it is hoped that the joint community will use this new version of Excalibur to form a new "Round Table" that will aid in the defense our country from potential aggressors.
III. Are Joint Information Operations Effective?
" today. Walt noted that strategists charged with developing strategic ideas within the individual services are rarely "objective" scholars; their job is to ensure that their service's interests are promoted. This phenomenon is evident when considering the development of both service and joint IO Doctrine. In taking into account "the politicization of doctrine", one can see that each service is an expert within its domain as dictated by law, and each one views doctrine via its respective "world view". The unfortunate side effect is that they apply the same principles used in their military doctrine to their IO doctrine. The problem with this approach is that the concept of IO transcends the traditional boundaries of modern warfare, and it should be engaged from an entirely different plateau. In essence, when thinking about JIO, one must get out of a "playing checkers" mindset and jump into a "threedimensional chess" mode. an IO attack, it will not necessarily be limited to military elements. As identified in Presidential Decision Directive 63, the U.S.' national infrastructure is a prime target for hostile powers. However, this did not occur. In truth, the U.S. seemingly has little in the way of tactics, techniques, Serabian, reported that the U.S. is increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks by an increasing list of terrorist and foreign governments. 13 Serabian explained that said countries are using IO to "level the playing field" when engaging the U.S. In effect, IO serves them as a "David" to the U.S.'s "Goliath".
b. Who is in Charge of
- Harmonizing Service IO Functions reflects the composition of that team.
In this figure, the Combatant Commanders provide a representative at the table. As was noted, each service retains its own IO doctrine created based on its operational "world view". Effective change will commence once service doctrine evolves to transcend the boundaries of service "group think", and begins to disassociate IO from service-specific control. Joint leadership must work together to help break down the parochial walls and guide their services towards a purer form of JIO. The current version of JP 3-13 is a good start for this as it outlines a decent IO template. However, it falls short by being conceptual rather than directive in telling services the forms a synchronized JIO effort would take. This is a fine line. Should the JCS guidance be directive down to the service level? As it could infringe on Combatant Commander authority, this would be a valid concern. Nevertheless, there has to be a better way to leverage service competencies in this regard. The Combatant Commanders remain the key to success at this level, and they must guide their teams to break down service-centric barriers and develop a process more applicable for the times. Table: Rethinking "DoD Jointness" and "National Jointness".
b. Expanding the Round
In parallel with the Combatant Commanders' efforts, the joint IO community should expand the "Round Table" outward to include other entities critical for effective IO campaigns. If the worst-case scenario happens, the U.S. military will not be the only team to engage and defend against the enemy. It will need significant assistance from agencies within the government such as the National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Imaging and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to facilitate IO initiatives. Effective JIO will also require strong partnerships with the judicial arm of government to ensure the actions taken are legal and will withstand the "Washington Post" test if revealed for world judgment. Linkages with national media will be an absolute necessity to ensure the truth gets to the American and global public when the U.S. engages in or responds to IO. Figure 2 :
Setting IO Standards and Building Key Relationships reflects the types of relationships needed to make this work. By leveraging these relationships effectively, the joint team will be able to design crossfunctional responses for IO, and thus have a hand in influencing the entire landscape of IO. These new partnerships take on a more realistic shape for "jointness"; they change the size of the joint team to include all affected stakeholders and allow us to leverage our full national capacity against the threat. Everything written up to this point has been driving towards a single thought: The U.S. needs unity of effort for JIO. The old models no longer work, and the joint community needs to think differently about the problem to obtain a workable solution. Dr. Daniel Kuehl, one of the most respected experts in the IO discipline, agrees. He wrote, "The impacts and implications of the information revolution are so widespread that they necessitate a broader, more inclusive concept incorporating all of the various elements of national information power. National security in the information age and the development and exercise of the information component of national power requires a new paradigm of jointness that incorporates and synchronizes the policies and activities of all the players in the information realm." 16 Others have also advocated the need for harmonization and stronger unity of effort. In James Adams's testimony to the Senate, he references the need to "leave the old body [and] move into a new one" by "beginning to make changes in our cultural, political, and economic processes and institutions of such magnitude that they will dwarf even those that accompanied the industrial revolution". 17 In addition to the plethora of doctrinal guidance, research papers, and articles available on the topic of JIO, the Research Team analyzed some of the best practices and thoughts from universities, consulting firms, and strategy experts to help forge an appropriate construct. Figure 3 TTPs, knowledge assets, and plans are not shared with industry or with Media presidents such as CNN.
The old adage of "train as we fight" is applicable to this situation. Influence IO's Global Strategic Development: Sun Tzu once wrote that it is the apex of strategy to win a fight without fighting. 19 The experts have already highlighted the various cases where other nations 19 Sun Tzu, "The Art of War", Online Version, http://www.sonshi.com/learn.html it is a sure path to failure. Instead, the joint team needs to reshape the future to one of its choosing and force enemies into the "killbox" designated by it. By shaping the future of JIO, the U.S. gets to that future first and can force enemies to "bring a knife to a .50 cal fight". As shown in Figure 5 :
Influencing the Strategic Battlespace, the JIOST is the focal point for synergizing the effort. It is their charge to develop the strategic foresight into how IO should change over time, to synchronize the community's efforts for mapping a strategic architecture, and then to help "build" that future.
According to Hamel and Prahalad, a strategic architecture is a "high-level blueprint for the deployment of new functionalities, the acquisition of new competencies (or migration of existing competencies), and the reconfiguring of the interface for those who receive the benefit of said competencies". 20 The
JIOST would use this blueprint to forge a future where the U.S. influences how other countries build IO TTPs. Since the U.S. has the best technology infrastructure in the world, it currently has leverage over how others could use technology and IO concepts. However, this lead is quickly diminishing.
For example, during the Gulf War, Iraq was able to effectively use IO as an asymmetric tool. With it, they were able to influence international opinion and thus affect U.S. policy. 21 Clearly, a race is on.
This means that the U.S. cannot afford to sit back and watch. It needs to set the pace and establish the standard. It also means that the U.S. needs to rethink how it develops the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. In "Unrestricted Warfare", Liang and Xiangsui cited their extensive use of U.S. doctrine and guidance to formulate their conclusions. 22 The U.S. can use documents like these to guide the rest of the world down the road we want them to walk while simultaneously forging ahead on a different vector. Since Perception Management is a critical component of IO, the U.S. should become experts in global Perception Management. The JIOST can aid in that endeavor. 20 Ibid. Hamel and Prahalad, "Competing for the Future" 21 Consider Strategic Architecture to be the "brain" and strategic intent to be the "heart" of the effort that implies significant stretch for the joint team. This intent would then translate into a discussion between the JIOST, learning institutions and technology-centric firms to determine what core competencies the U.S. would need in the future. Then, they would help to shape the development of those competencies, matching them to the strategic architecture previously discussed. The result would be a joint effort to secure "intellectual IO leadership", influence the strategic landscape of the battlespace and preempt any advantages of possible use to potential enemies.
The Joint Information Operations Value Chain: Clearly, the path to effective JIO lies through achieving unity of effort by redefining how the U.S. views "jointness" and rethinking the processes for 23 Ibid, "Competing for the Future" for the U.S., and does that value exceed the real or implied costs of producing it? This aspect of the construct is what separates it from other IO constructs produced by others.
V. Conclusion
This is not an easy subject to address. There are probably as many options, thoughts, and beliefs on the concept of Joint Information Operations as there are definitions in Webster's Dictionary.
There are also equal amounts of unanswered questions concerning JIO. Despite those concerns, there are some very evident truths:
1) Information Operations will be both a strategic asset and a strategic liability for the U.S. in the coming years.
2) The U.S. can achieve a strategic, competitive advantage in this area if it chooses to shape the future rather than react to the future.
3) The U.S.' ability to shape the future will be achieved only when it has expanded its views on "jointness" to include the larger communities of industry and federal government, and together work towards defining the core competencies needed to prosecute effective Joint Information
Operations campaigns.
Change sometimes requires "thinking out of the box". Effective change requires one to shred the old box up and elevate one's thinking. Using this new version of Excalibur as a construct for uniting U.S.
JIO activities can help simulate thought and discussion so policy makers can attack the problem more effectively. By making the complex issues more understandable, it provides a framework for resolving many of the questions posed in this Joint Critical Analysis. Additionally, if followed to its logical conclusion, the construct can address the joint and interagency IO collaboration issues that remain some of the most prevalent challenges in this discipline. In reference to a previous analogy, it is time for the team to remove the checkers board in preparation for the 3-D chess game. It is time to Wield
Excalibur and Seek Unity of Effort in Joint Information Operations.
